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Editors' Note: This essay was presented at 
the Central Division meetings of the Society 
for the Study of Ethics and Animals, held in 
New Orleans, April, 1990. 
The occasion for this paper was an invitation from 
organizers of the Society for Classical Realism to 
participate in a special session, at the American 
Philosophical Association Central Division Conference, 
of the Society for the Study of Ethics and Animals. 
Implicit in this invitation was the idea that those 
interested in classical realism, ofwhich I am one, might 
make some contribution to the debate about the value 
of animals and, thereby, to the broader discussion of 
our actual obligations to the other-than-human aspects 
of nature. In this short essay I will offer some 
preliminary reflections on the philosophical foundations 
of the discussion of ethics and animals and conclude 
that classical realism as a philosophical style in fact 
lends itself to such foundational considerations. 
In my mind, not only can classical realists contribute 
positively to this important debate, but there is one 
particularly scholarly line of argument in this complex 
discussion that is especially compatible with the 
classical realist philosophical style. Moreover, J. Baird 
Callicott leaves a very rich clue for classical realists, in 
one of his well-known essays on environmental ethics. 
I will try to demonstrate shortly that this clue could 
help orient classical realists in their efforts to contribute 
to the discussion about ethics and animals. 
The essay to which I am referring is "Animal 
Liberation: A Triangular Affair."l The title betrays the 
primary purpose of the piece. Callicott argues that the 
debate over the liberation and rights of animals is not a 
bipolar one, as has often been maintained, but is, rather, 
three-sided. The three competing positions are, as 
Callicott distinguishes them, ethical or moral humanism, 
humane moralism, and environmental ethics. The 
ethical humanists argue that nonhuman animals are not 
worthy ofbeing accorded moral standing because "Only 
human beings are rational, or capable of having 
interests, or possess 'self'-awareness, or have linguistic 
abilities or can represent the future ...."2 This does not 
necessarily mean that animals may be treated 
inhumanely. Rather, animals may be treated as "means" 
and need not be treated as persons or ends in themselves. 
The humane moralists, on the other hand, argue 
against the ethical or moral humanists, claiming that 
even in lieu of possessing the aforesaid qualities that 
serve to constitute personhood, animals are "sentient" 
beings. Since animals possess "sensibility," it is argued 
that they suffer pain and that" ...we are morally obliged 
toconsider their suffering as much an evil to be minimized 
by conscientious moral agents as human suffering."3 
While the ethical humanists and the humane moralists 
surely differ as to whether animals are beings who can 
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legitimately have moral consideration extended to them, 
Callicott argues that they are similar in important ways. 
He argues that adherents to both of these theoretical 
approaches locate moral value in "individuals" (whether 
human or human and animal). Both approaches extend 
moral consideration to some individuals and exclude 
others. In the end Callicott argues that both positions 
are atomistic, reductive, and distributive. 
As distinguished from ethical humanism and 
humane moralism, Callicott defines environmental 
ethics as a "holistic or collective," and therefore not 
atomistic or reductive, theoretical approach to the 
valuation of animals. Indeed, this environmental ethic 
is called "ethical holism" because it".. .locates ultimate 
value in the [whole] 'biotic community' .....4 It is in 
fact the greatest good, Le., the summum bonum, of the 
whole ecosystem, or the natural community, which 
" ...serves as a standard for the assessment of the relative 
value and relative ordering of its constitutive parts and 
therefore provides a means for adjudicating the often 
mutally contradictory demandS of the parts considered 
separately for 'equal' consideration."s 
Animals, as only one of the constitutive groups 
which make up the biotic community, would have their 
value determined, like the other parts, relative to the 
practical impact that such a valuation would have on 
the other natural entities (e.g., plants, minerals, waters, 
soils, etc.). More importantly, the value accorded to 
animals would be assigned in lightof theprojectedeffect 
on the "common good" or the ".. .integrity, stability, 
and beauty of the biotic community... '>6 Callicott's 
environmental ethic is "holistic" and not reductive 
because it does not arise out of a reduction to some 
privileged individual(s) which serves as the standard 
for moral consideration. Rather, moral consideration 
is born of a comprehensive valuation of the biotic 
community as such. 
Callicott's inspiration for this holistic environmental 
ethic is, of course, AIdo Leopold and his "land ethic." 
In fact he argues that Leopold's land ethic is a modem 
classic and can be treated as "the standard example, 
the paradigm case...of what an environmental ethic 
is."? He suggests that while he will employ Leopold's 
land ethic as something of an exemplar type in his 
effort clearly to distinguish environmental ethics from 
animal liberation and animal rights-based ethical 
theories, he does not hold that all environmental ethical 
systems must conform to Leopold's to be termed 
"environmental ethics." 
On his way to the claim that "holism" is the most 
"creative, interesting and practical" theory among the 
three in question, Callicott gives a brief but very nice 
summary of Leopold's land ethic. There is one 
especially noteworthy moment in this summary and 
analysis of Leopold's ethic. It is the point at which 
Callicott attempts to explicate the core of the land ethic 
by comparing it to Plato's moral and social philosophy. 
It is in this comparison that we can discern a "clue" as 
to the direction that classical realist approaches to the 
valuation of animals might take. His suggestion is 
that Plato's ethic is holistic in a very similar way to 
that holism that lies at the heart ofLeopold's land ethic. 
Callicott's comparison of Plato's position to that of 
Leopold is captured in the following passage: 
From the ecological perspective, according to 
Leopold as I have pointed out, land is like an 
organic body or like a human society. According 
to Plato, body, soul and society have similar 
structures and corresponding virtues. The 
goodness ofeach is a function of its structure or 
organization and the relative value of the parts 
or constituents of each is calculated according 
to the contribution made to the integrity, stability 
and beauty ofeach whole.s 
Callicott goes on to exploit this notion that the order 
and goodness of the whole is the standard for the 
function and the value of the parts. He cites several 
examples of how this principle was employed in 
Plato's Republic. 
The good of the ideal state, indeed the possibility of 
justice and happiness in that state, depended on the 
assignmentof function and value in all arts and sciences, 
in virtually all human ambition, in such a way that the 
well-being of the community or the city as a whole was 
preserved. Ofcourse, in the Republic the discussion of 
the just, well-ordered city occurs first, in part, to make 
way for the claim that a soul is comparable to a city 
and, as equally well-ordered, would be both just and 
happy. The parts of the soul, Le., reason, spirit, and 
desire, having different functions and capacities for 
excellence or virtue, needed to be ordered in such a way 
that there occurred a harmony. This harmony was 
understood as the primary condition necessary for a 
morally virtuous life. This balance, stability, and beauty 
of the order ofsoul and city, Callicott suggests, is nicely 
mirrored in Leopold's land ethic. 
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But Calljcott does not plumb the comparison of 
Leopold and Plato nearly enough. First, scholarship 
on the Republic has shown that "lifting" Plato's political 
philosophy, for example, out of this dialogue is a diffi-
cult enterprise at best9 Second, and more importantly, 
the comparison between Plato and Leopold remains at 
the surface. He invokes Plato's ethics and politics, and 
even in the examples of the subordination of parts to 
whole that he cites from the Republic, Callicott doesn't 
appreciate the support for these claims he might have 
gotten by unearthing the metaphysical and ontological 
foundations of Plato's political philosophy and value 
theory. 10 It is with a fuller appreciation of these 
metaphysical underpinnings that classical realists will 
begin to discern a true compatibility between holistic 
environmental ethical systems like those ofLeopold and 
Callicott and systematic, metaphysical classical realist 
philosophies, like that of Plato. 
In the remainder of this essay I'll try to make this last 
claim more clearand compelling. However, I would like 
to place the same qualification on my remarks about the 
use ofPlato's thoughts that Callicott places on his, at the 
beginning of the essay, "Animal Liberation: ATriangular 
Affair," regarding his discussion of Leopold Recall, 
. Callicott said that while "Aldo Leopold.. .is universally 
recognized as the father or founding genius of recent 
environmental ethics,"l1 he only intended to useLeopold's 
land ethic as a "paradigm" or the exemplary type of the 
holistic environmental ethic he was about to describe. 
It seems to me that Plato has been viewed as 
something of a "father" or founding genius of classical 
realism.12 And yet I am making no claim that all 
classical realist forays into the battle over the value of 
animals need be Platonic. I am claiming only that 
perhaps by using Plato's philosophy as an exemplar of 
classical realism we can find a uniquely classical realist 
way into the debate about ethics and animals. 
Let me return now to my earlier claim that Callicott, 
while leaving a clue for classical realists, perhaps dido't 
exploit his comparison between Leopold and Plato 
enoughP Callicott says that "Plato...never develops 
anything faintly resembling an environmental ethic. 
Plato never reached an ecological view of living 
nature."14 He follows this remark with the claim that 
Plato was primarily, "...if not exclusively, concerned 
with moral problems involving individual human beings 
in a political context. .. "15 It seems to me that the first 
of these remarks by Callicott is overstated and the 
second is quite wrong. 
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While it is perhaps true that we don't have a dialogue 
or even a body of texts which bear out a Platonic 
environmental ethic, there are numbers ofplaces, most 
especially in the Republic, the dialogue to which 
Callicott refers most, where interesting connections can 
be made between some of the key notions in Callicott's 
holistic environmental ethics and Plato's philosophy. 
A brief discussion of just some of these connections 
will demonstrate both the richness ofCallicott's original 
comparison of Leopold and Plato and his failure to see 
beneath the social and political level of the comparison 
to its metaphysical foundation. 
At the center of the holism ofCallicott and Leopold 
is the notion that the biotic community has a summum 
bonum, a common, holistic good. This summum bonum 
is defined by Callicott, in this essay, in terms of 
"stability, integrity and beauty."16 The holistic 
ecological perspective sees the value of the biotic 
community as the standard for the value of its members. 
This good is one which, as stable, beautiful and unified 
or integral, is of a certain "order." In fact Callicott's 
discussion of holism is pervaded by the notion that the 
goal of environmental ethics is to discern the "order" 
of the biotic community and to assign value and to 
prescribe legitimate use of the constituents of the 
community in a way that contributes to the unity, 
harmony and balance of the eco-system. 
As we know, Plato makes similar kinds of claims 
about the good of souls and cities. Justice is in fact 
defined several times in the Republic as the harmony 
or appropriate order among the parts of the whole, 
whether in cities or in soulsP We must remember, 
however, that for Plato, especially in the Republic, 
justice is "natural" to us. In fact, the argument about 
the origin and nature of justice is framed against a 
backdrop of claims by some people that being just is 
"against our nature."18 
Justice in the soul is understood by Plato to be 
"natural" in the same way that the "natural" order of 
the body is said to be health. So, the natural good, order 
and excellence of the soul is justice. In relation to city 
and soul Plato ties together, under the umbrella of 
justice, goodness, integrity or unity, stability or 
harmony, and ultimately beauty, as he refers often to 
the "fine" or beautiful nature of the well-ordered soul. 
Yet even more interesting is the fact that Plato uses 
the word phusis and various forms of it to indicate the 
nature of things, or what he thinks is "natural." The 
Greek word phusis itself referred to the natural or 
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appropriate order, constitution or structure of a person 
or thing.t9 For a thing to have a "nature" was for it to 
have an appropriate order, an essential arrangement of 
the parts in the whole. 
For Plato the stability, beauty, and integrity of the 
ideal or excellent soul or virtuous and ideal city, i.e., 
the appropriate order and good of each, was "natural." 
Even the universe for him was a kosmos or an "order" 
and was so "by nature." 
While Callicott may have been correct in saying that 
Plato never developed a systematic environmental ethic, 
it seems clear thatby tying together the idea of thephusis 
or the nature of things with their inherent "order" or 
structure, Plato laid the "metaphysical groundwork" for 
those who would take this clue as foundational to 
arguments that would maintain that the natural world 
was to be valued as a unity, an order, a whole. 
It must also be mentioned that Callicott is, ofcourse, 
correct in saying that the body, soul, society and cosmos 
are the "wholes" of Plato's universe.20 TItey are not, 
however, the only, or pemaps the most important ones. I 
am thinking about the wholes to beat all wholes, i.e., the 
transcendent ideas or forms. In Book X of the Republic, 
we learn that these essences are "in nature" produced by 
god. They were begotten by god as "one" by nature. 
The natural order, and thus reality itself, is 
constituted by the forms. It is toward this more 
comprehensive sense of "the natural" as "the orderly" 
or "the whole" that ecological holisms like those of 
Leopold and Callicott could turn. The real consists in 
the orderly. Thus the stability, integrity, and beauty of 
Callicott's biotic community would be for Plato an 
imitation of the more cosmic harmony, beauty and unity 
of the intelligible realm of ideas, of reality itself.21 
This essay has been an attempt to provide classical 
realists with one possible avenue by way of which they 
may contribute to the ethics and animals debate. If 
Plato's classical realism is taken as an example, it would 
seem that holistic or environmental ethical approaches 
to establishing the value of animals, as opposed to the 
ethical humanist and the humane moralist approaches, 
would prove most fruitful. 
The focus ofsuch holistic approaches on unity, on the 
good of the whole, and on more ultimate, largely 
transcendentprinciples like stability,beauty, and integrity, 
would be most complemented by classical realist 
philosophies which were founded on similar ultimate 
notions which imply an understanding of nature as an 
order and a unity. The whole idea of approaching 
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ecology22 in general, and the valuation of animals in 
particular, from a metaphysical, foundational perspective 
on the relationship between the whole and its parts, the 
one and the many, would provide for rich insight and for 
a unique contribution to the valuation of animals debate. 
Notes 
1 I will be quoting from the version of this essay which 
appeared in People, Penguins andPlastic Trees: Basic Issues 
in Environmental Ethics (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth 
Publishing Company, 1986), pp. 184·203. The essay was 
originally printed in Environmmtal Ethics, 2, no. 4, (Winter 
1980): pp. 311-338. 
2Ibid., p. 186. It should be mentioned thatCallicottexpends 
considerable effort identifying individual theorists with one of 
the three major positions he defines. Lof course, will not be 
expending efforts in this direction, because the point of this 
present essay is not to parse and/or categorize theories, but to 
determine a general theoretical direction which would be 
suggestive or fruitful for classical realists to follow. 
3 Ibid., p. 187. 
4 Ibid., p. 197. 
S Ibid., p. 190. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid., p. 184. 
8 Ibid., p. 192. 
9 For instance, it is unclear to what extent, if any, Plato 
intended the ideal city of the Republic to be an actual "blue-
print" for society. More to the point, the examples that 
Callicott cites concerning infanticide, the mating ritual and 
the destruction of the family alone need to be interpreted 
contextually. 
10 Callicott does cite as well Plato's Gorgias, 503d-507a, 
(p. 202, Note 33). However, the discussion of the relationship 
of "whole to parts" is again fundamentally ethical or social/ 
political. A major concern in this Platonic dialogue is, of 
course, rhetoric. 
11 Callicott, p. 184. 
12Plato is a classical realist, in part, because he argued for 
the existence of the "ideas" or the "forms," He claimed that 
the forms were separate, intelligible beings that existed 
independently of the mental or linguistic activities of human 
beings. These forms, e.g., justice, beauty, courage, etc., were 
considered by him to be the ultimate realities, the ground of 
all claims to knowledge and truth. 
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13 It must be said that Callicott's project, in his essay, and 20 See Callicott, p. 202. 
mine in this present paper are quite different. I am in no way 
arguing that his "holism" needs a classical realist defense. 21 See Republic, 596 b-e. 
14 Callicott, p. 202, note 37. 22 Plato so often uses "health" as a metaphorical way of 
talking about order and nature or what is "natural." (In 
15 Ibid. footnote 25, p. 201, Callicott notes that toward the end of 
"The Land Ethic," Leopold himself discusses "land health.") 
16 See p. 190, for example. Environmental holists and/or ecologists could be encouraged 
to "push" such metaphors so as to uncover the metaphysical 
17 See Plato, The Republic ofPlato, Allan Bloom. Trms. grounds of their own claims. Callicott is quite right to point 
with notes and Interpretive Essay (New York: Basic Books out that "Ecology makes it possible to see land as a unified 
Inc., 1968): 435b-c and 443a-e. system of integrally related parts ... [as a] whole (p. 189). 
He adds that ecological science can do this " without the 
18 See the "Story ofGyges," in Republic II, 359b&ff. One least hint of mysticism or ineffability" (ibid.). However,
point of this tale is that humans, "by nature," are unjust. metaphysics may provide amore all-encompassing conceptual 
framework from within which to articulate and defend 
19 See listing ofphusis inLiddell andScott's GreekEnglish 
environmental holism and the inherent value of nature and 
Lexicon (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976). 
natural entities, including animals. 
Let them remember, 
God of all Life, 
What it was like in the jungles of Vietnam, 
To be stalked by silent killers, 
To see their friends strung up and pierced by hidden booby traps, 
Deprived of any final dignity. 
Let them feel once again their sorrow 
For life cut off in its prime, 
For friendships ended by strangers with their own agendas, 
Dealers in impersonal death. 
Let them relive their horror 
At seeing the chopped up bodies of their buddies 
Stuffed into plastic bags; 
Let them remember their secret longings 
For a world 
With no killing. 
Betty Jahn 
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